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Abstract 
This paper explores local union organising in the context of corporate mergers 
which have become increasingly common. Through a multiple case study of 
14 cases between 1995 and 2002, we find that unions in eleven cases organise 
themselves unilaterally, locally and mainly around strategic and advisory 
activities during corporate mergers. Thus, unions seem reluctant to adapt 
their own formal structures to the corporate changes. Our study reveals that 
most unions are dissatisfied with the effects of the corporate merger as a result 
of loosing formal representation as well as perceived influence. In three of our 
cases, unions have been able to maintain or increase formal representation as 
well as perceived influence and are consequently satisfied with the merger. In 
each of these three cases, the unions chose to cooperate and integrative forms 
of organising. One preliminary conclusion of this study is that unions suffer 
from corporate mergers partly as a result of organising ineffectively during 
these mergers. As national and institutional differences are found insufficient 
to fully explain these findings, further studies are needed to explain why 
unions organise themselves in any given way during corporate mergers. 
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Exploring Union Organising During Corporate Mergers – 
14 Swedish Cases Between 1995 and 2002 
INTRODUCTION 
During the 20th century, unions have achieved a strong position not only towards corporations 
but also inside corporations. Through the different enforced acts of co-determination during the 
1970s, the unions’ role in corporate decision-making structures was established as well as 
formalised. One consequence of this development was the emergence of so called local union 
structures, that is formal union organisations at the corporate level as distinct from the 
traditional union organisations at the industry or national level. These local union structures are 
formally a part of some industry level union, however they often have an autonomous hierarchy. 
As local unions was expected to take an active part in the internal development of corporations, 
these developments can be expected to have an effect on the way local unions, and thus unions 
in general, organise. 
One major such form of corporate development is corporate mergers. By mergers we mean 
within the context of this paper ‘mergers-of-equals’. In the 20th century, the frequency of 
corporate mergers has increased. During the 1990s, the last and greatest of four so called 
merger waves during the 20th century took place with an annual merger volume in terms of 
capital value of around 1200 billion US dollars (Larsson & Wallentin, 2001). Corporate mergers 
are relevant to unions for a number of different reasons. Primarily though, mergers are often 
decided on with a purpose of realising economies of scale. This often involves significant cost 
reducing measures which more often than not means reducing the number of employees. 
In this context, questions arise whether or not local unions from the two different merging 
companies should cooperate during and after the corporate merger process. Cooperation is 
made difficult as the interests of the local unions involved may be mutually exclusive. One other 
factor making cooperation difficult appears during so called cross-border corporate mergers 
when cultural and institutional differences complicate negotiations. On the other hand, unions 
not cooperating may be played out against each other by the management, thereby loosing even 
more in terms of influence and subsequent benefits for its members. These issues have seldom 
been explored and even less so from an organisational perspective. Thus, knowledge in this area 
is limited, a condition which this paper is making a first preliminary attempt to remedy. 
This paper attempts to describe how local unions organise themselves during corporate mergers 
as well as the effects of these ways of organising. No previous research on the subject has been 
found. We use a multiple case study in order for us to be able to answer the first research 
question of this working paper. 
The study consisted of 14 cases of corporate mergers. The 14 case studies spanned a range of 
industry sectors. They include three pharmaceutical company mergers, three mergers between 
financial services firms, two mergers between firms in the ICT and telecom sector, two mergers 
within the food and beverages industry as well as four additional mergers within the forest, 
steel, energy and building/contractor industries respectively. This paints a broad overall picture 
of union organising in various settings.   3
The multiple case study was conducted during the spring of 2003. The selection of cases was 
made from Affärsvärldens annual compilation of corporate mergers and acquisitions in Sweden. 
A search was made for the period between the start of 1995 and the end of 2002. First we 
eliminated internal group transactions. Second, we chose to focus on larger corporations with 
the criteria that the corporation should be noted on the A-list of the Stockholm Stock Exchange. 
This procedure left us with 130 cases. Our second criteria was that it should be a merger 
between equals, otherwise it is not a merger but rather an acquisition. We decided that the 
smallest part in a corporate merger should be at least 2/3 the size of the larger part. This left us 
with 15 cases. We approached each of these 15 cases, where 14 of them chose to participate in 
our study. Data was collected through the use of formal, structured interviews. We interviewed 
the president of each of the local unions involved in the corporate merger process, when 
necessary we interviewed a second representative. In all, 19 interviews were conducted. Of 
these, eleven was conducted over telephone for reasons of geographical distance. From these 
interviews, we categorised each case on a number of different variables. These variables was 
generated from our empirical data. Each case was commented upon and verified by the different 
interviewees. 
RESEARCH MODEL 
In order to be able to cross-compare the data and reach some preliminary findings to the 
research questions, we have constructed a specific research model. Working backwards, we 
identified five relevant categories of data with a number of variables in each category. We 
labeled these categories ‘structural contingencies’, ‘cognitive contingencies’, ‘union operating 
responses’, ‘union organising outcomes’ and ‘effects of union organising’. These categories 






Figure 1: Research Model for Union Organising During Corporate Mergers 
In the category ‘structural contingencies’, we list a number of ‘objective’, measurable, and 
exogenous contingencies for union organising. Three main variables are identified within this 
category: a) is the merger cross-border?, b) number of unions involved, and c) existing arenas of 
formal representation. The first variable, cross-border, is relevant as we include some cases 
which are not cross-border. This is necessary in order to evaluate the importance of national 
systems. The last variable, arenas of formal representation, is necessary in order to evaluate 










Contingencies   4
‘Cognitive contingencies’ includes variables of a more subjective or endogenous character, based 
on the notion that union officials’ attitudes and preconceptions are likely to have an effect on the 
way unions choose to organise themselves. Three variables are identified within this category: d) 
view on relationship, e) view on cooperation, and f) view on corporate merger. The variables 
are increasingly specific. The first variable defines the respondents’ view on union-corporation 
relationships in general in terms of three generic forms of such relationship: conflict, negotiation 
and partnership. The second variable positions the respondents’ view on the nature of the 
specific cooperation within each case on a continuous scale from ‘very negative’ (1) to ‘very 
positive’ (5). This scale is used for the last variable as well, describing the respondents’ view on 
the corporate merger itself. 
The following category, ‘union operating responses’, attempts to identify what, if any, 
operational union responses corporate mergers actually do initiate during the merger process. 
This is based on the assumption that structure is not independent of the tasks performed within 
the organisation nor the people performing these tasks. We identify three variables within this 
category: g) involved actors, h) union activity level, and i) degree of union cooperation. The 
first variable charts whether or not the primary union actors involved are local or central, or 
both. From this variable we will learn whether or not corporate mergers are constructed as a 
local or a central union issue primarily, as well as get an idea as to the nature of the relationship 
between local and central union structures. The second variable, union activity level, depicts on 
what levels (strategic, advisory, operational and/or medial) unions participate during the 
merger process. A strategic activity level in this study implies representation on the corporate 
board while operational activity implies participation in specific committees or task forces used 
to integrate the two companies. The last variable uses three degrees of union cooperation during 
the merger process (action, interaction and co-action) to establish whether or not local unions 
cooperate during merger processes and, consequently, if such cooperation have any impact on 
union organising subsequent to the merger. 
The fourth category, ‘union organising outcomes’, uses three variables to define the outcomes 
on union organising by corporate mergers. These three variables are: j) union integration, k) 
hierarchical levels, and l) union identity. The variable of union integration is the main variable in 
this category as it defines four generic and increasingly substantial forms of union integration: 
network, cooperation, federation and integration. Network is the most loose form of union 
integration involving no new or additional formal union structures, and no new formal 
association between the participating unions beyond personal contacts. The second form, 
cooperation, implies the existence of a new forum for inter-union discussions, though a forum 
without any decision-making authority over each respective union. Federation, the third form, 
on the other hand means the establishing of a formal, central union structure with some 
decision-making authority in joint matters. However, the former unions still exist as formal 
organisations and retain a significant degree of autonomy. This is not the case for the fourth 
form, integration. Here the participating unions are formally integrated into one new and 
common union structure and thus integrated at all hierarchical levels. We also try to define 
whether or not the number of hierarchical levels increase or decrease, variable k), as a response 
to corporate mergers. The last variable in the category, union identity, show whether the local 
union has shifted in the focus of organisational point-of-reference as a result from the corporate 
merger from the union to the company. We have defined this variable as previous research   5
indicate that the way in which unions identify themselves matters as to how they are able to 
maintain efficiency, as discussed in the article’s introduction. 
Lastly, the category ‘effects of union organising’ defines three variables that all can be viewed as 
bottom-line effect variables as each focus on actual influence, either from an objective or a more 
subjective point-of-view. As we are focusing on the effects of internationaliation on unions’ 
abilities to influence corporate decision-making, variables measuring influence thus need to be 
defined. Influence is however an eluding concept as it is virtually impossible to find any 
objective way of measuring it. We deal with this dilemma by splitting influence into two 
variables: m) arenas of formal representation, and n) perceived union influence. The first 
variable sees actual representation as necessary for influence and, when comparing it to the 
corresponding variable c), measures the effect on formal representation by the corporate 
merger. In disregarding other more informal arenas for union influence, as well as equating 
representation with influence, this variable is however not fully sufficient. The second variable, 
perceived union influence, introduces a more subjective measure on union influence as 
interviewees are asked to state whether or not they perceive union influence to have increased 
or decreased as a result of the corporate merger. This variable has the advantage of incorporating 
all aspects of influence, its disadvantages are that it opens up subjective judgments that may be 
both uninformed and unsubstantiated as well as politically motivated. Added to these two 
variables is a third variable: o) view on corporate merger, which corresponds to variable f) 
earlier. By comparing these two variables to see if the view on the merger has changed for better 
or for worse, we achieve a measure of union satisfaction with the outcome of the corporate 
merger process from a union perspective. All variables in this category is measured on a scale of 
three; increase (+), no change (0) or decrease (-). 
Interpretation of Results 
The study we have conducted is an exploratory study, and as such its results are to be viewed as 
preliminary and as a starting point for future research. This is especially the case regarding the 
links between specific ways of union organising with efficiency. Results related to this issue will 
be presented as propositions, indicating the tentative nature of the article’s findings. 
Some other notes are important to make regarding the interpretation of the results in this study. 
First, as the variables are constructed by the authors, albeit through interaction with the 
empirical material, a certain degree of subjectivity must be observed. Second, what is measured 
is not necessarily a factual reality but rather the interviewees’ description or interpretation of 
reality. For instance, when a union official describes the cooperation with the company as 
positive it means that he perceives it to be positive, not that it de facto is positive. 
RESULTS 
The results from the survey is presented in Figure 2. All cases have been anonymized for reasons 
of non-disclosure. All data is presented variable by variable, according to the categories and 







































































































              
a)  Cross-border  Merger x    x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x  x 
b)  Number  of  Unions  2 2 2 2 4 2 5 3 5 3 2 2 2 4 
c) Arenas of Formal 
Union Representation 
              
     Strategic  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
    Advisory  x x x x x x x  x  x x  x 
    Operational    x  x         x 
Cognitive 
Contingencies 
              
d)  Relationship  View                
     Conflict     x  x         
     Negotiation  x x x      x x x x x x x x 
     Partnership  x x x x x x x x x x x x  x 
e)  Partner  View  3 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 4 
f)  Merger  View  3 4  4+ 4+ 2+ 2 4 3 4 4 4 3 4  4+
Union Operating 
Responses 
              
g)  Involved  Actors                
    Local  x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 
    Central     x  x  x        x 
h)  Union  Activity  Level               
    Strategic  x x x x x  x x x x x  x x 
    Advisory   x x x x x x x x  x x x x 
    Operational  x  x x x  x  x     x 
    M e d i a l         x         
i)  Union  Cooperation                
    Action   x    x  x  x x x x  
    I n t e r a c t i o n   x         x       
    Co-action    x  x  x  x       x 
Union Organising 
Outcomes 
              
j)  Union  Integration                
    Network  x x    x  x x x x x x  
    Cooperation        x       x   7
    F e d e r a t i o n      x            
    I n t e g r a t i o n     x   x           
k)  Hierarchical  Levels  - 0 0 +  + 0 0 0 0 0 + 0 - 0 
l)  Union  Identity                
    Union  x     x  x    x  x  x  
    Company   x x x x   x x x    x 
Effects of Union 
Organising 
              
m) Effect on Formal 
Union Representation 
- - 0 + 0 - - 0 0 0 0 - - 0 
n) Effect on Union 
Perceived Influence 
- - + + + - - 0 0 0 - - - 0 
o) Effect on Merger 
View 
- - + + + - - 0 0 0 - - - 0 
Figure 2: Results from Multiple Case Study on Union Organising During Corporate 
Mergers 
The data highlight certain specific structural contingencies for the 14 cases. Ten of the cases are 
cross-border mergers, whereas four of them are domestic in character. In ten of the cases the 
number of unions involved range between two and three, in no case does the number of unions 
involved exceed five. In every case, unions are represented in the strategic arena of formal 
representation, the corporate board. This is to be expected, as each case has at least one Swedish 
part and Swedish legislation specify the formal right for union representation on each corporate 
board. In many cases, eleven out of 14, unions are also represented in the advisory arena of 
formal representation; for example on group councils, works councils etc. However, only in 
three cases – Case C, Case E and Case N – are the local unions represented in the operational 
arena of formal representation. 
A number of specific cognitive contingencies are also highlighted in the data. It is notable that a 
partnership view on labor-company relations are prevalent in all cases except one, combined 
with primarily a negotiation view. Only in two cases – Case D and Case F – there existed a 
conflict relational view from the point-of-view of one of the involved unions. This is consistent 
with the dominant Swedish industrial regime, focusing on collaboration, partnership and a 
mutual understanding of each others’ goals and objectives. The other data show that the view of 
the relationship with each specific corporate partner was consistently positive, in all cases the 
union representatives signified their specific relationship as favorable (3) or highly favorable (4). 
The unions’ specific view on the corporate merger itself was almost equally positive. In twelve 
of the cases local unions indicated a favorable view on the corporate merger. Only in two cases 
– Case E and Case F – the view were less than favorable. 
Union Operating Responses 
Focusing on union operating responses to the corporate merger, we first find that the merger is 
primarily constructed as a local union issue. Local unions are involved in each of the 14 cases.   8
Central unions are involved only in four of the cases, in conjunction with local unions, in which 
cases their role were limited to providing legal assistance. 
Second, data show that local unions are active on several levels during the corporate merger 
where activities on the strategic (the corporate board) and advisory levels are the most 
commonly used tools in order to respond to the corporate merger; in twelve of the 14 cases 
local unions where activated in one or both of these levels. Union activity on operational levels 
on the other hand are observed only in half of the cases while union activity in the media is 
restricted to only one case. 
Thirdly it can be observed that some degree of union cooperation during the corporate merger 
is featured in only half of the cases. In two of the cases – Case A and Case I – the local unions 
involved chose to interact with each other; i.e. establish formal communication between them, 
informing each other of their respective position. In five cases, unions instead opted for a co-
action response to the corporate merger, actively coordinating their representative efforts and 
policy positions towards their corporate counterparts. In the remaining seven cases, local unions 
made no observable effort to interact with their respective union partners. 
Union Organising Outcomes 
Looking instead at union organising outcomes of the corporate merger, we find that union 
integration as a result of the merger is even more uncommon than union cooperation during the 
merger process. Only in three cases – Case C, Case D and Case E – have the unions chosen two 
of the higher degrees of union integration; federation or integration. Two of these – Case C and 
Case E – have chosen integration as their form of union integration. In another two cases – Case 
G and Case N – union integration has reached the degree of cooperation, i.e. a formal forum for 
discussion and exchange of information. In the rest of the nine cases, union integration has been 
non-existent beyond the point of personal contacts, choosing the network form of union 
integration. 
The number of union hierarchical levels remain mostly unchanged. In three cases the number of 
levels increase while in two cases, the number of union hierarchical levels decrease after the 
corporate merger. In the rest of the cases, the corporate merger has no effect on the number of 
hierarchical levels within the local union. Analysing in turn the effect on the union point-of-
identity of the corporate merger we find that in eight cases the local union to a higher degree 
tend to organise themselves with the corporation rather than the central union organisation as 
the point of reference. This illustrates that corporate mergers have a tangible effect on the 
mindset of the local union officials. 
Effects of Union Organising 
Studying the data, we find a number of effects of union organising as a result of corporate 
mergers. For instance, it can be noted that in six of the cases local unions loose access to certain 
formal arenas of representation, more specifically the corporate board, whereas they gain access 
to formal arenas in only two cases. In the rest of the cases, the access to formal arenas remain 
unchanged. In seven cases, the effect on unions’ perceived influence is negative while the effect   9
is perceived as positive in only two cases; Case D and Case E. In five cases, the effect on 
perceived influence is dismissable. The data for the last variable, the union view of the corporate 
merger after the merger process, show a distinctly more negative view of the merger than 
before. In seven cases the unions were displeased of the way in which the corporate merger had 
been conducted and its subsequent effects on union interests. Only in two cases were the view 
of the merger made more positive by the merger process, whereas in the rest of the cases the 
view of the merger remain unchanged. 
How do local unions organise themselves during corporate mergers? 
Going back to the first research question of this article – in what ways do local unions organise 
themselves during corporate mergers? – we find that our survey allows an initial answer to the 
question. The first part of the answer is that unions organise themselves locally at the workplace 
as a response to the corporate merger. The corporate merger is constructed as a local union 
issue rather than a central one. A second part of the answer will be that unions have a tendency 
to organise themselves unilaterally both during and after the merger. During the merger, 
unions choose interactive forms of organising in no more than half of the cases. This ratio 
decreases further if you consider union integration after the merger where a higher degree of 
integration was chosen in just three out of 14 cases. Lastly, unions organise themselves mainly 
around strategic and advisory activities, but decidedly less so around operational issues and 
forums. Indirectly, this choice may be a result of lacking the sufficient resources due to their 
local and unilateral way of organising. A tempting albeit not altogether justified answer to our 
first research question would thus be: not at all, or, at least, as usual according to existing and 
prevailing local union practices. 
So cooperation and integration between local unions during and after corporate mergers is 
scant. From previous studies (Looise & Drucker, 2002; Gennard & Newsome, 2005), we might 
deduct that this would have negative effects on union efficiency and satisfaction. Our results 
support this idea as local unions have lost formal representation in six cases, lost in perceived 
influence in seven cases as well as being generally less positive towards the merger in seven 
cases. This means that corporate mergers as often as not is bad news for local unions. Still 
however, we can not make any argument as to if and how local union organising is in any way 
connected to union efficiency. To be able to do so, we need to cross-relate our different 
variables searching for patterns and interrelations. This will be done in the following part of the 
article. 
ANALYSIS 
One starting point for this article was the idea that the different ways in which the local unions 
organise themselves influence to what degree the unions are able to remain efficient and 
influential in the face of internationalisation. This implies that differences in national legislation 
cannot fully explain differences in outcomes and effects of union organising during corporate 
mergers. The findings of our study support this assumption. Of course, national differences do 
matter. We find that in domestic corporate mergers, local unions are able to maintain their 
formal representation in three out of four cases. In cross-border corporate mergers, local unions 
were only able to maintain or increase their formal representation in five out of ten cases. The   10
same goes for the effect on unions’ perceived influence as well as union satisfaction; cross-
border mergers rate favorably in only four out of ten cases for these variables however. This 
said, it should be noted that several cases of cross-border union organising reveal that it is 
possible to find efficient ways of of co-organising. Also, in a number of domestic corporate 
mergers, unions have failed to create more substantial forms of cooperation. Thus, factors at an 
organisational level are needed to provide a more distinct explanation as to why unions organise 
differently and with different results during corporate mergers. The following analysis will 
through a number of propositions outline a set of such organisational factors. 
Proposition 1: Union satisfaction with corporate mergers is positively related to whether unions are 
able to maintain or increase union influence 
In all cases but one, union satisfaction with the corporate merger corresponded exactly with the 
change in unions’ perceived influence after the merger. The same holds for the relationship with 
changes in formal union representation after the corporate merger, although only in eleven cases 
instead of 13. There exist a positive relationship between the different variables as less 
satisfaction is derived from reductions in formal representation and perceived union influence. It 
can be argued that the reason for this connection between influence and satisfaction is the 
rationality of the union as a political or idea based organisation whose main objective is to 
promote certain beliefs and values as well as influence decision-making. Thus, its main measure 
of success lies rather in the impact of its ideas on corporate or political decision-making 
pertaining to its area of interest. 
Proposition 2: Union influence is positively related with unions using the company as the organising 
point-of-identification 
In all eight cases where the local union’s point-of-identification is the company, the local unions 
are able maintain or improve their access to formal arenas of union representation. Whereas 
they are only able to do this in one out of the six cases where the local union’s point-of-
identification is the central union structure. One way of understanding this relationship is by 
emphasizing the importance of a common mindset and a shared understanding regarding the 
nature and objectives of the corporation. Communication between union and management is 
facilitated if both parties have a relatively similar view of the corporation and it is reasonable to 
assume that influence is more likely to follow from a good rather than a bad communication. 
There may also arise a conflict in corporate and union priorities, as local unions need to 
negotiate the priorities of the corporation and the central union simultaneously. 
Proposition 3: Union influence is positively related with high degrees of union integration 
In each of the three cases where the local unions adopt one of the higher degrees of union 
integration (federation or integration) after the corporate merger, the unions are able to 
maintain or increase their perceived influence as well as their formal representation. The other 
eleven cases in which the unions realise one of the lower forms of integration (network or 
cooperation), unions loose in perceived influence as well as formal representation. The benefits 
of an integrated and coordinated unions when negotiating with a corporate counterpart have   11
been listed a number of times in previous research. Integrated unions are less likely to be subject 
of corporate strategies designed to play out the different unions against each other. Thus, a 
coordinated union response increase overall union bargaining power vis-à-vis management. 
Proposition 4: Union integration is positively related with high degrees of union cooperation during 
the corporate merger process 
In all three cases of high forms of local union integration (federation or integration), local unions 
display a high degree of union cooperation as they co-act closely throughout the corporate 
merger process. In seven out of the nine cases in which the local unions choose not to integrate 
at all, using the network mode of integration, local unions do not cooperate during the merger 
process. One could argue that for two separate local unions to integrate their operations, a 
relationship and a a necessary level of trust need to be established between the local unions. 
From this perspective, the merger process could be viewed as a trial period or a way of 
establishing such a trust before having to make the decision to formally integrate or not. 
Proposition 5: Union integration and cooperation is positively related with both strategic as well as 
operational levels of union activity during the corporate merger process 
In all of the five cases in which local unions show any form of union integration (cooperation, 
federation or integration), local unions are active at the operational level during the corporate 
merger. When they are not active at the operational level, as is the situation in seven of the 
cases, local unions have each time chosen the network mode of union integration. 
Correspondingly, the local unions have in each of these seven cases chosen the lowest degree of 
union cooperation during the merger, ‘action’. In the seven cases where unions in fact are active 
at the operational level they have chosen one of the higher degrees of union cooperation; 
‘interaction’ or ‘co-action’. One way of explaining this relationship would be to say the local 
unions’ understanding of the change process, the implication of the merger on the corporation as 
well as its effects on union operations and interests is enhanced when participating at an 
operational level as the discussions become less abstract and the effects become localised and 
easier to grasp. The need for the local unions to cooperate and subsequently integrate may thus 
be better illustrated through a more comprehensive understanding of the merger and its effects. 
Also, participating in operational arenas constitute another arena in which local unions meet and 
interact, creating a relationship between them and possibly a better understanding of each 
other’s values and interests. 
The results also suggest a list of different possible interrelationships between the different 
variables. These relationships, however, do not possess the empirical strength to merit a 
proposition. We choose to view these connections as tendencies worth noting. This mainly 
concern two contingencies to union organising, one structural and one cognitive: Existing 
Arenas of Formal Representation and Partner View respectively. These  show that the levels on 
which the unions choose to activate themselves during corporate mergers are dependent upon 
their access to arenas of formal representation as well as a perceived positive relationship 
between the union and its corporate counterpart. Unions activating themselves at an operational 
level during the corporate merger tend to presuppose that unions have access to arenas at the   12
operative level prior to the corporate merger. Also, unions are rarely operationally active during 
the merger process if their relationship with management is weak. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Our results suggest that corporate mergers generally mean bad news for unions. In five of the 
cases, unions lose their representation on corporate boards, while in a number of cases they 
experience a formalised relationship with management leading to a reduction in their perceived 
influence. 
We performed a number of comparisons between our studied variables of union organising, 
attempting to see if we could thereby come closer to explaining union organising. We found 
that there are certain ways of union organising that appear as more effective than others during 
corporate mergers, yet these ways of organising are chosen in only a few of our studied cases. A 
number of questions is raised by this insight. Most notably, why do unions organise themselves 
in a given way during corporate mergers? As shown, our multiple case study has been unable to 
provide any “rational” answers to this question. 
By studying structural contingencies, we have been able to demonstrate that while national 
differences explain some of these discrepancies, they are unable to provide a full explanation of 
our findings. Unions within one nation organise themselves differently in spite of identical 
national preconditions. Simultaneously, it is obvious that it is possible for unions to organise 
themselves effectively across national borders (compare for example MeritaNordbanken and 
TeliaSonera). However, in several cases of cross-border union organising, union organising was 
found to be ineffective. 
Wanting to learn more about the answer to the question of why unions organise themselves in a 
given way during corporate mergers, we are forced to proceed with further studies more 
distinctly approaching this question. Efforts to explain union organising during corporate 
mergers are made in a second paper following this one. 
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